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 DERELICT OF DUTY:  
THE AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA,  
TERRORISM, AND THE WAR IN IRAQ 
DOUGLAS M. MCLEOD* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Normative conceptions of the role that news media organizations should 
play in democratic societies prescribe two related, yet at times contradictory, 
functions for the press: (1) The news media should provide a forum for 
competing ideas so that the public can make informed, intelligent decisions; 
and (2) the news media should play an active role in ferreting out the truth.  
The sad reality is that in the coverage of social conflicts, especially in the 
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the media do an inadequate 
job of performing either of these functions.  In fact, the media may incorrectly 
interpret and act on social conflicts in ways that are dysfunctional to conflict 
dynamics, leading to tragic consequences. 
To shed light on these processes, this Article begins by discussing 
normative ideals for news media in democratic systems.  These ideals are 
most crucial during times of domestic and international conflict, which 
especially illuminate the shortcomings of media practice.  These deficiencies 
are illustrated through the discussion of the role the media played during the 
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks and the build-up to the war 
in Iraq.  The American media‘s wholesale acceptance of Bush Administration 
claims about al-Qaeda connections to the Iraqi government, as well as about 
Iraq‘s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) program, constitutes a 
dereliction of duty.  The mainstream media‘s failure to thoroughly investigate 
these claims contributed to public misconceptions about Iraq, and paved the 
way for what, in retrospect, has been largely acknowledged as both a human 
tragedy and a foreign policy disaster for the United States.  This Article 
provides a discussion of some of the systemic explanations for this failure, 
followed by an assessment of what became of these normative journalistic 
ideals.  In turn, the discussion moves to a consideration of how current media 
practices impact the nature of social conflict, and concludes with a proposal 
for how media practice could be improved. 
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II.  JOURNALISTIC IDEALS IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS 
Based on centuries of philosophical and political writings on the basic 
normative principles of democratic systems, as well as on the research 
literature on journalistic practices, Michael Gurevitch and Jay Blumler 
proposed eight normative standards for mass media systems in democratic 
societies: (1) the surveillance of relevant events; (2) the identification of key 
issues; (3) the provision of platforms for advocacy; (4) the transmission of 
diverse political discourse; (5) the scrutiny of institutions and officials; (6) the 
activation of informed participation; (7) the maintenance of media autonomy; 
and (8) the consideration of audience potential.
1
  Although the significance of 
all of these normative ideals is accentuated during times of social conflicts—
as they involve ways in which the media can help ensure that social conflicts 
stimulate progressive social change rather than divisive social decay—five of 
these ideals are particularly germane to this discussion. 
First, the media play a role in publicizing important events and in bringing 
significant issues to the public agenda.  In this way, they are part of the 
―surveillance‖ function of the press identified by Harold Lasswell.2  As part of 
this surveillance function, the media do more than just provide a conduit for 
information; they play an important gatekeeping role in determining the 
relative importance of events and issues by judging their potential impact on 
society.  But the media not only assess inherent importance, they must also 
take into account that the citizens they serve attach very different values to the 
importance of events and issues.  These judgments are complex under ideal 
conditions, and are only further complicated by the current budgetary crisis 
that confronts most mainstream media, resulting in dwindling resources to 
provide surveillance.  These constraints have increased the pressure to rely on 
official sources for ―information subsidies‖ in the interest of economic 
efficiency.  Economic pressures also have led to more efficient news styles 
that emphasize ―infotainment,‖ ―personality journalism,‖ ―pseudo-events,‖ 
―soft news,‖ and ―talk show politics.‖ 
When it comes to social conflicts, the media must not only highlight key 
events and issues, they should also seek to identify various interested parties, 
stakeholders, and positions.  They should put these conflicts into context and 
reveal the forces that shape circumstances and outcomes, as well as evaluate 
possibilities for equitable resolutions to conflicts.  All too often, such 
decisions are not made in a balanced and impartial way, but are subject to the 
 
1. Michael Gurevitch & Jay G. Blumler, Political Communication Systems and Democratic 
Values, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 269–270 (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990). 
2. Harold D. Lasswell, The Structure and Function of Communication in Society, in THE 
COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS: A SERIES OF ADDRESSES 37–38 (Lyman Bryson ed., 1948). 
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influence of power within the social system.
3
  Moreover, issues are often laid 
out in episodic, decontextualized, and ahistorical ways.
4
  As such, media 
agenda-setting may not take place in a meaningful and constructive manner, 
and may be more influential in replicating existing conditions rather than in 
fostering progressive change. 
Such criticism of the media extends to the normative ideal of scrutinizing 
social institutions and government officials; the cherished image of the news 
media as watchdogs has been threatened by the lack of resources available for 
investigative reporting.  The demise of the ―fourth estate‖ has been 
underscored by recent crises and controversies stemming from government 
and business institutions that have operated virtually unchecked by 
investigative journalism.  Moreover, the limited investigative reporting that 
remains may be focused too low in the chain of offenses, or may be focused 
too much on problematic individuals than on more systemic causes.  This 
fundamental attribution of error may be especially limiting when it comes to 
the resolution of conflicts; it highlights individual scapegoats in a way that 
may intensify conflicts and deflects attention away from the systemic roots of 
problems that may hold the key to potential solutions, all the while fostering 
public cynicism that poisons the conflict atmosphere. 
Positive conflict outcomes are facilitated by the richness of the 
marketplace of ideas as provided by the media.  Ideally, the media provide 
platforms for a variety of ideas and viewpoints to be disseminated to the 
concerned citizenry and, through the process of public sifting and winnowing, 
the best ideas ultimately will prevail.  In practice, the marketplace is skewed 
in favor of official interests, whose voices often come across loudest in 
conflict situations.  Rather than amplify the voices and perspectives of the 
disenfranchised groups and citizens who need amplification most, the media 
often serve those who need it least.  This skew is legitimized by news routines 
that are organized around institutions of power.
5
  It is reinforced by the 
ideologies of objectivity and press autonomy that tend to filter out non-
mainstream ideas, as the media hesitates to give platforms to challengers, 
critics, and radicals out of concern that they would appear as advocates with 
an axe to grind.  On the other hand, media organizations do report official 
opinions without thinking twice.  The result is that citizens may be rather 
close-minded toward alternative perspectives and lower status groups in 
 
3. J. HERBERT ALTSCHULL, AGENTS OF POWER: THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC POLICY 155 (2d ed. 
1995). 
4. SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? HOW TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL ISSUES 
15 (1991). 
5. LEON V. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS: THE ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS OF 
NEWSMAKING 4 (1973). 
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conflict situations.
6
 
Such practices translate into reduced diversity in political discourse, and 
thus fail to satisfy another normative ideal.  Diverse, multilateral discussion 
among relevant parties is essential for functional social conflict.  However, 
there is considerable concern that the media provide only a limited discourse, 
―bounded politically by the two-party system, economically by the 
imperatives of private enterprise capitalism, and culturally by the values of a 
consumer society.‖7  Groups outside the mainstream are treated as ―deviant.‖8  
As a result, citizens lack awareness—much less understanding—of political 
alternatives, and may fail to recognize and articulate their own interests.  In 
the process, the marketplace of ideas is narrowed and opportunities for 
successful conflict resolution are diminished. 
As noted by researchers and media critics alike, the media often fall far 
short of these democratic standards.  Gurevitch and Blumler suggest that four 
major obstacles hamper the media‘s ability to live up to these normative 
goals.  First, in certain situations, these ideals may be contradictory.
9
  For 
example, the goal of providing a forum for diverse viewpoints may become 
problematic when the facts suggest that a particular viewpoint is correct and 
others are not.  Second, the agenda and perspectives purveyed by the elite 
communicators who dictate the media agenda may disenfranchise common 
citizens.
10
  Third, many citizens in a free, democratic society may choose to 
be politically disengaged.
11
  Finally, social, political, and economic conditions 
may inhibit the media‘s pursuit of these democratic ideals.12 
When it comes to social conflicts, we may collapse five of the 
aforementioned normative ideals into two: (1) the representation of the 
diverse viewpoints of various parties to the conflict (which combines the 
ideals of the provision of platforms for advocacy and the transmission of 
diverse political discourse), and (2) the necessity of evaluating these various 
viewpoints and rendering decisions in light of the preponderance of facts—the 
process of getting to the truth (which combines the ideals of providing 
surveillance of relevant events, the identification of key issues, and the 
 
6. Douglas M. McLeod & James K. Hertog, Social Control, Social Change and the Mass 
Media’s Role in the Regulation of Protest Groups, in MASS MEDIA, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE: A MACROSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 305, 319 (David Demers & K. Viswanath eds., 1999). 
7. Gurevitch & Blumler, supra note 1, at 269. 
8. Douglas M. McLeod & James K. Hertog, The Manufacture of ‘Public Opinion’ by 
Reporters: Informal Cues for Public Perceptions of Protest Groups, 3 DISCOURSE & SOCIETY 259, 
260 (1992).  See, e.g., TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN THE 
MAKING & UNMAKING OF THE NEW LEFT 32 (1980). 
9. Gurevitch & Blumler, supra note 1, at 270–71. 
10. Id. at 271. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 272. 
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scrutiny of institutions and officials). 
Not only are these normative ideals most crucial when societies are 
engaged in domestic or international conflicts, but such conflicts also provide 
excellent opportunities to evaluate the media‘s performance with regard to 
these normative ideals.  Toward that end, this Article now presents a case 
study of media coverage of one such conflict: the 2003 decision by the United 
States to go to war against Iraq.  By examining the nature of news content of 
this conflict, we can evaluate the performance of the media and whether they 
lived up to these normative ideals. 
III.  AN ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA PERFORMANCE 
Evidence for this case study is provided by an examination of the 
transcripts of the CNN and Fox News coverage of the conflict over U.S. 
policy toward Iraq during the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks, which led to the war in Iraq that began on March 20, 2003.
13
  This 
conflict was chosen because it exemplifies a period of high-visibility conflict 
that had broad-sweeping social and political ramifications.  The analysis 
focuses on two particular aspects of this coverage: the Bush Administration‘s 
contentions about alleged al-Qaeda connections to the Iraqi government and 
its contentions regarding the presence of WMDs in Iraq.  These charges, 
which were brought by the Bush Administration against Saddam Hussein and 
his former Iraqi government, were instrumental in providing justification for 
the U.S. attack on and ultimate occupation of Iraq, which has now lasted more 
than six years.  Throughout this period, these charges remained at the core of 
the official U.S. policy rationale for the country‘s actions in the Iraq conflict, 
though neither allegation has ever been substantiated. 
In fact, the bipartisan September 11 Commission dismissed the Bush 
Administration‘s often-repeated contentions about an alleged connection 
between the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda.
14
  The report refuted Vice 
President Dick Cheney‘s claim of ―overwhelming‖ evidence of a ―long-
established‖ link between Saddam and al-Qaeda.15  The report noted that the 
Iraqi government had rejected overtures from Osama bin Laden in 1994 and 
1996.
16
  The report also refuted other claims by the Bush Administration 
about the al-Qaeda connection, including Cheney‘s assertion that September 
 
13. David E. Sanger & John F. Burns, Bush Orders Start of War on Iraq; Missiles Apparently 
Miss Hussein, N.Y.  TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at A1. 
14. Walter Pincus & Dana Milbank, Al Qaeda-Hussein Link Is Dismissed, WASH. POST,  
June 17, 2004, at A1. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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11th attacker Mohamed Atta had met with Iraqi officials in Prague in 2000.
17
 
In the process of interrogating detained al-Qaeda members Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
waterboarded them 83 and 183 times respectively to collect information about 
al-Qaeda operations.
18
  One of the primary directives of Bush Administration 
officials was to seek information about linkages to Iraq.
19
  Though these 
interrogations revealed information (some of which was of questionable 
validity) about potential al-Qaeda attacks, the detainees provided no 
information about any linkages to Iraq.
20
  A general consensus has emerged 
that Bush Administration assertions about the al-Qaeda connection were at 
best misinformed—and, at worst, intentionally disingenuous—in an attempt to 
justify the invasion of Iraq. 
The claim regarding WMDs in Iraq has been similarly debunked.  No 
WMDs were found, much less used, in Iraq, when U.S. troops invaded and 
toppled Saddam Hussein‘s government.  In his book, The Way of the World: A 
Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism, Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalist Ron Suskind presented evidence that, prior to the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, the Bush Administration had intelligence information that Iraq did not 
possess WMDs, chose to ignore that information, and, in fact, was complicit 
in manufacturing evidence in the form of a forged memo from the head of 
Iraqi intelligence.
21
  Again, a clear consensus has emerged that the Iraqi 
government did not possess WMDs as claimed by the Bush Administration. 
This analysis focuses on the period surrounding U.S. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell‘s speech to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003.22 
Powell laid out the case for military action against Iraq based on arguments 
about the Iraqi links to al-Qaeda and Iraq‘s possession of chemical, nuclear, 
and biological WMDs.
23
  In the process, he showed aerial photographs of 
buildings and trucks that were alleged to be used for manufacturing biological 
weapons.
24
  He also noted that Saddam Hussein ―has made repeated covert 
attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes‖ for use in making 
 
17. Id. 
18. Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, at 
A1. 
19. See James Risen, No Evidence of Meeting with Iraqi, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2004, at A14; 
Philip Shenon, C.I.A. Warned White House that Links Between Iraq and Qaeda Were ‘Murky’, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 10, 2004, at A7.   
20. Shenon, supra note 19. 
21. RON SUSKIND, THE WAY OF THE WORLD: A STORY OF TRUTH AND HOPE IN AN AGE OF 
EXTREMISM 181–84 (2008). 
22. Live Event/Special (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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nuclear weapons.
25
 
Prior to Powell‘s speech, there was no broad public consensus about 
whether to go to war with Iraq, nor was there a consensus among experts 
regarding Bush Administration assertions about the al-Qaeda linkage or about 
WMDs.  In retrospect, neither the alleged connection between al-Qaeda and 
Iraq, nor Iraq‘s alleged possession of WMDs, has survived.  However, at the 
time, Powell‘s presentation was very persuasive and played an integral role in 
providing the impetus for war. 
For many Americans, this was a pivotal moment in terms of whether or 
not to support the escalation of the conflict in Iraq.  It came at a time when the 
American public was considering whether the United States should allow 
more time for weapons inspections and sanctions to deal with Iraq, or whether 
it should take more direct action.  As most Americans had no first-hand 
experience that they could use to make up their own minds regarding  
al-Qaeda connections and WMDs in Iraq, they were largely dependent on how 
these issues were portrayed in the media.  Americans‘ knowledge was based 
not only on televised coverage of Powell‘s presentation itself, but also on the 
nature of media coverage leading up to his speech, as well as the post-event 
spin included with this coverage. 
This analysis focuses on media coverage surrounding Powell‘s speech to 
assess how the media treated these two crucial issues of the al-Qaeda linkage 
and WMDs.  CNN and Fox News were chosen because they are two of the 
most important sources of news information for many Americans, and they 
provide a decent bellwether to indicate how these events were covered, 
digested, and packaged for mass consumption. 
The questions for this analysis are: How did CNN and Fox News report 
these two Bush Administration claims during the period leading up to the 
invasion of Iraq, to what extent did they provide countervailing viewpoints 
and evidence, and at what point did they begin to draw conclusions based on a 
preponderance of evidence?  Ultimately, the results will be used to assess 
media performance with regard to the aforementioned normative standards in 
the context of this dispute. 
To answer these questions, this analysis includes all transcripts for CNN 
and Fox News programs for the week surrounding Powell‘s speech (February 
1, 2003 to February 8, 2003) that contained either the phrases ―al-Qaeda‖ or 
―weapons of mass destruction‖ within ten words of the terms ―Saddam 
Hussein‖ or ―Iraq.‖  For this Article, qualitative examples that were either 
typical or particularly illustrative were isolated for discussion. 
 
25. Id. 
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A.  Coverage of Colin Powell’s Speech to the U.N. Security Council 
Prior to Powell‘s appearance, television pundits set the stage by posing the 
question of whether Powell would present the ―smoking gun‖ in terms of 
evidence against Iraq.  During Fox News Sunday, host Tony Snow asked the 
roundtable panelists, ―Colin Powell is going to give a speech to the United 
Nations Wednesday.  He evidently is going to present some new evidence 
regarding Iraq and weapons of mass destruction.  How important is it?‖26  
Mara Liasson responded, 
 
Well, it‘s very important because there are countries 
saying we‘re waiting to hear this, if the evidence is 
compelling, we‘re going to be with the United States.  I think 
there are some countries who would like to be with the 
United States and have a way to explain to their own 
domestic populations who are against the war why they are 
[supporting the U.S.]. 
. . . . 
. . .  You‘re not going to have some kind of a smoking 
gun, where there are pictures that are so incredibly dramatic 
and shocking.
27
 
 
Bill Kristol, political commentator and Republican strategist, declared 
with confidence, ―Powell is going to show that there are loaded guns 
throughout Iraq.  And what he will then say is, ‗We cannot allow them to 
become smoking guns.‘‖28 
Journalists imbued Powell‘s speech with critical importance in 
determining both international and domestic support for intervention in Iraq, 
as typified by this CNN report: 
 
In many countries around the world, Colin Powell 
perhaps is the most respected figure in this Bush 
Administration for making the case on Iraq.  As for American 
citizens, well, the latest CNN/USA Today poll, Gallup poll, 
shows on the importance of Powell‘s presentation of 
evidence, 60 percent of the people say it‘s very important, 27 
percent say what Powell‘s presentation will be, 27 percent on 
somewhat important, 12 percent saying not important at all.
29
 
 
 
26. Fox News Sunday (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 2, 2003). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. American Morning with Paula Zahn (CNN television broadcast Feb. 4, 2003). 
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The day of Powell‘s speech, reporters such as CNN‘s Dana Bash were 
brimming with excitement and anticipation: 
 
[T]he [S]ecretary‘s presentation, we are told, will be about a 
90-minute-long presentation, audio, video, really a 
multimedia presentation the likes of which the U.N. hasn‘t 
seen in quite some time.  And the main thrust of Secretary 
Powell‘s presentation will be to show officials at the U.N. 
that Iraq is, first of all, has weapons of mass destruction and 
second of all, is hiding them from the inspectors . . . . 
. . . .  
. . .  Secretary Powell along with a lot of folks here at the 
White House have been sifting through mountains, really 
mountains of intelligence, classified information that they say 
really does show that Iraq is, has weapons of mass destruction 
.  .  .  .
30
 
 
Here, Bash substantiates the notion that Powell‘s testimony is grounded in 
fact, rather than supplemented by ideology in a rush to judgment. 
Not only was Powell‘s testimony broadcast live, but portions of it were 
replayed throughout the following days.  Video clips from the speech were 
often used to lead into news stories and panel discussions, and were often 
integrated into the discussions.  As such, regular CNN viewers were treated to 
repeated excerpts of the Powell speech. 
In general, Powell‘s presentation was met with rave reviews from a 
variety of journalists who appeared as talk show panelists.  For example, Mort 
Zuckerman of U.S. News & World Report stated, 
 
Well, he was very good.  He spoke in a measured tone.  
He has great credibility.  And the fact that it was Colin 
Powell, who was perceived by many in America and many in 
the world as the most skeptical about the American approach 
to Iraq, was very, very important.  He has enormous 
credibility and enormous charisma, and he was foursquare 
now behind what the president [said].
31
 
 
The Washington Post‘s Bob Woodward said on CNN that Powell‘s 
presentation ―obviously was very strong. . . . [W]hen you put it all together 
the accumulation was profound. . . . And as Powell said, there was no 
smoking gun.  My assistant who looked at it, who‘s a lot younger said, 
 
30. American Morning with Paula Zahn (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
31. The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
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‗Maybe no smoking gun, but there‘re [sic] shell casings all over the floor.‘‖32 
Fox News reports presented the viewpoints of numerous Republican and 
Democratic Senators who lauded Powell‘s performance.  Democratic Senator 
Joe Biden said: ―I think Secretary Powell made a very powerful and, I think, 
irrefutable case today.‖33  Republican Senator Richard Lugar called the 
testimony ―extremely powerful.‖34  Democratic Senator Joe Lieberman was 
quoted as saying that the speech was ―compelling, convincing, and chilling.‖35  
Democratic Senator Tom Daschle remarked, ―The methodical way in which 
the [S]ecretary laid out his case was effective and I‘m sure added his ability to 
build the coalition that we have advocated now for several months.‖36 
Fox News commentator Bill O‘Reilly reinforced this portrayal of 
bipartisan support: 
 
Here in the United States, Secretary Powell‘s speech was 
generally a success.  Even dovish congressmen like Al C. 
Hastings of Florida admit Mr. Powell made a very persuasive 
case that Iraq is violating U.N. Resolution 1441. 
A few Democrats, most notably Nancy Pelosi and Ted 
Kennedy, nitpicked the speech, but clear thinking Americans 
know the gig is up for Saddam.  He‘s violated the U.N. 
mandate. 
It‘s interesting because none of the Democratic 
presidential candidates said very much because they know 
most Americans support President Bush.
37
 
 
Moreover, O‘Reilly characterized the speech as swaying the official 
policy of other nations: ―[O]verseas, opposition to removing Saddam is 
shrinking.  Germany and France are on the defensive, China is wishy-washy 
and Russia is on board.‖38 
The media also depicted foreign dignitaries as supporting Powell.  In one 
Fox News interview, Israeli Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, 
 
I thought he made a very compelling and truthful case.  I 
think he exposed the nature of the Iraqi regime, its deceptions 
and all the attempts it is making to conceal the fact that it is 
 
32. Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
33. Lou Dobbs Moneyline (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
34. Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. The O’Reilly Factor, supra note 31. 
38. Id. 
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building weapons of mass destruction, its connections to 
terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.  I think this was a powerful 
case, powerfully made.
39
 
B.  Coverage of the Al-Qaeda Connection 
Journalists largely believed Powell‘s contention regarding al-Qaeda 
operations in Iraq.  For example, CNN national security correspondent David 
Ensor concluded, 
 
So there you have it, and you saw George Tenet, the 
director of Central Intelligence, sitting behind Colin Powell 
as he made those statements.  In the past, intelligence officers 
in the U.S. have expressed some skepticism about the ties.  I 
am now talking to them.  They‘re saying the evidence is 
stronger and stronger, and you see this group, they say, still 
operating in Baghdad, still moving money, supplies, and 
personnel in and out of Iraq that is loyal to Zarqawi and  
al-Qaeda.
40
 
 
Ensor summarized Powell‘s presentation with respect to Iraq‘s ties to 
terrorism by stating, 
 
There was high drama in the satellite pictures and 
intercepted conversations.  But the most significant new 
assertions from Secretary Powell concern Iraq‘s ties with 
terrorists.  And come from multiple sources, officials say, that 
simply could not be revealed. 
Evidence of connections between Saddam Hussein and 
Osama bin Laden‘s al-Qaeda, through this man, Abu Mousab 
al-Zarqawi, the al-Qaeda figure who Powell said spent two 
months in Baghdad last year.
41
 
 
CNN international correspondent Sheila MacVicar further summarized 
Powell, saying, 
 
Secretary of State Powell called the relationship between 
Iraq and al-Qaeda a—quote—―sinister nexus‖ and said this 
man was the link. 
. . . . 
 
39. Your World with Neil Cavuto (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
40. Live Event/Special, supra note 22. 
41. Lou Dobbs Moneyline, supra note 33. 
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Powell said this camp in Northern Iraq was established by 
Zarqawi‘s networks for training in poisons.  He says that 
although it was an area not controlled by Saddam Hussein‘s 
government, a senior agent representing Baghdad had offered 
al-Qaeda safe haven in the region.  And Powell claimed that 
Zarqawi had established a network of two dozen men in 
Baghdad last summer while he was getting medical treatment 
there.
42
 
 
When journalists reiterated elements of Powell‘s speech, they rarely, if ever, 
treated his contentions as anything other than established fact. 
Politicians made frequent appearances supporting Powell‘s assertion about 
the al-Qaeda connection.  For example, Republican Senator Pat Roberts 
commented to CNN‘s Wolf Blitzer on Powell‘s speech, 
 
That caught the attention of the American people.  And it says 
the [sic] al-Qaeda, who are in Iraq, have a cell in Baghdad 
and have basically a poison center and they are educating and 
training and are going to dispense those kinds of biological 
weaponry or say chemical weaponry and it can go to Europe, 
it can go to the United States.  Finally the American people 
say, ―Hey, we‘ve got a problem.  We got to take care of 
this.‖43 
 
Reaction in support of Powell‘s contentions included that of foreign 
dignitaries such as Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana: 
 
I think it was persuasive, and I think the whole case that 
Secretary Powell made today was pretty credible. 
Again, I think he made an extremely strong impression on 
all of us, and I think that there is compelling evidence that 
Hussein and his regime have a tactic for deceit for decades 
and I think Secretary Powell made a strong impression and 
the al-Qaeda connection was forceful as well.
44
 
 
From news depictions of international reactions, a viewer would think that the 
world was solidly behind U.S. intervention in Iraq. 
Concern about the Iraqi role in international terrorism was enhanced by 
CNN reports of government surveillance of various individuals within the 
 
42. Newsnight with Aaron Brown (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
43. Wolf Blitzer Reports (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
44. The Big Story with John Gibson (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
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United States.  Kelli Arena reported: 
 
Sources say the FBI has a handful of individuals in the 
United States who are believed to be Iraqi intelligence 
officers under surveillance, along with hundreds of Iraqi 
sympathizers.  Sources say the FBI has not found evidence of 
any active terror cells in the [United States], but point out 
there is a danger individuals may act on their own.
45
 
C.   Coverage of the Issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
In covering the issue of WMDs, news reports often centered around 
statements by President Bush and high-level Bush Administration officials.  
For example, several stories on Fox News led with a video clip of President 
Bush making a definitive statement on this issue: 
 
We know that our enemies have been working to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction.  That is a fact. 
If their ambitions were ever realized, they would set out 
to inflict catastrophic harm on the United States with many 
times the casualties of September the 11th. 
So we‘re going to do everything in our power to protect 
the people and to prevent that day from ever happening.
46
 
 
This clip set up host Greta Van Susteren‘s panel discussion with three 
retired military officers, which was in anticipation of Powell‘s speech and was 
predicated on the assumption that Iraq possessed such weapons. 
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer backed up Colin Powell 
immediately before Powell‘s speech:  
Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, particularly 
chemical and biological weapons.  And of course, the 
President agrees with what Colin Powell has written. 
. . . . 
I think the reason that we know that Saddam Hussein possesses 
chemical and biological weapons is from a wide variety of means.  
That‘s how we know.47 
 
After Powell‘s speech, reporters repeated his statements in a way that lent 
credibility to them as established facts.  For example, Fox News senior White 
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House correspondent Jim Angle noted, 
 
In a multimedia presentation unveiling a range of newly 
declassified intelligence, Powell delivers a scathing 
indictment of Iraq‘s weapons programs and efforts to conceal 
them from inspectors.  What he called irrefutable and 
undeniable evidence.  For instance, Powell played intercepted 
conversations between Iraqi military officers in which they 
talk about getting rid of the evidence before an expected visit 
from inspectors.
48
 
 
In this report, Angle repeatedly summarized the evidence as laid out by 
Powell.
49
  Similarly, CNN‘s Andrea Koppel stated, ―Using charts and 
graphics, Powell said the [United States] believes Iraq has at least seven 
mobile biological agent factories mounted on at least eighteen trucks.‖50  
Again, the journalists provided little, if any, reason to doubt Powell‘s 
assertions. 
The talk show panelists on both CNN and Fox News were adamant in 
their affirmation of Powell‘s testimony.  For example, when David Gergen 
(who appeared on both CNN and Fox News) was asked whether Powell 
delivered the smoking gun, he responded, ―He sure had everything but the—
but the bullet itself.  It was conclusive, compelling evidence. . . . He 
demolished the argument that Saddam Hussein is not concealing weapons of 
mass destruction.‖51 
Rather than turn to only journalists and politicians, CNN also sought 
comment from technical experts.  For example, former United Nations 
weapons inspector Terence Taylor said, ―Well, I think it will be 
extraordinarily difficult to contradict this evidence.  When you connect it all 
together, it‘s a whole body of evidence.‖52  Ken Pollack, a former CIA 
analyst, commented, 
 
I was actually struck by both how conservative they were.  I 
think Colin Powell picked the evidence that he showed to 
make sure that it could really be substantiated . . . . That said, 
there is far, far more evidence out there.  I think that the great 
success of Colin Powell‘s presentation is I think he made an 
incredibly compelling case using just the limited amount that 
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he actually showed. 
. . . . 
. . .  I think the imagery showing some of these sites, 
demonstrating that the Iraqis clearly have chemical weapons 
in them, the decontamination vehicles, the signature 
vehicles.
53
 
 
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a call for action against Iraq, 
treating WMDs as an established fact: 
 
Iraq is a country in the middle of the region from which 
the terrorists that attacked New York and Washington came.  
From the middle of the region which financed and feeds 
terrorist networks. 
And are we going to say we‘re going to sit there and let 
weapons of mass destruction pile up in a country that has 
already used them against its neighbors and its own people, 
against which we fought a war ten years ago and which has, 
without any dispute, flagrantly violated all the agreements 
they made in 1991?
54
 
 
The most prominent source of opposition in the coverage was the Iraqi 
government itself (including Saddam Hussein), which was cited by both CNN 
and Fox News as denying both the general allegations of the Bush 
Administration and Powell‘s testimony specifically.  CNN Iraq correspondent 
Nic Robertson reported that ―reaction to Colin Powell‘s words or the potential 
for what he‘s going to say, which has been reported here, or at least picked up 
by Iraqi officials [is] that they say it‘s a fabrication.  They believe the satellite 
images that he‘ll use will be a fabrication.‖55 
CNN also acknowledged Iraqi media as refuting claims about WMDs.  
Robertson noted, 
 
[R]eaction in the newspapers here [in Iraq] to President 
Bush‘s meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
saying that everything that President Bush had to say about 
Iraq‘s weapons of mass destruction was lies, and 
characterizing Tony Blair, the British prime minister, as an 
attendant to the United States, saying that he‘d humiliated his 
country, that the U.N. weapons inspectors here had proved 
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everything Prime Minister Tony Blair had said was lies.
56
 
 
The audience likely discounted denials from Iraq, especially in light of the 
Bush Administration‘s repeated characterizations of Iraq as being part of the 
―axis of evil.‖  Outside the Iraqi government and media, opposition to the 
Bush Administration was relatively faint in news coverage leading up to the 
invasion of Iraq.  United Nations chief weapons inspector Hans Blix made 
several appearances, but mainly to say that Iraq, though cooperative with 
United Nations weapons inspections, was not fulfilling its obligation to 
disarm.
57
  However, Blix presented no direct evidence of WMDs.
58
 
When former President Jimmy Carter questioned whether the Bush 
Administration had made an adequate case regarding WMDs, he was soundly 
lambasted by Fox News host Sean Hannity: 
 
Jimmy Carter is a great former president, building houses, 
he‘s done some good work.  He‘s now becoming a menace in 
his constant, almost daily criticism of President Bush and his 
efforts to try to undermine him, which he‘s trying to do here.  
And what bothers me, his record now comes into play, and on 
foreign affairs it was a disaster, because we know Iran 
became a terrorist regime, took our guys hostages.
59
 
 
When the discussion on Fox News turned to the issue of whether the Bush 
Administration was exaggerating the threat of WMDs to advance its intention 
to go to war with Iraq, Fox News correspondent Major Garrett made an 
analogy to the Cuban Missile Crisis: 
 
[T]here is one striking similarity.  Back in 1962, many 
European countries though[t] the U.S. was exaggerating the 
threat in Cuba because it was obsessed with Fidel Castro.  
Many of the same countries think the U.S. is exaggerating the 
threat with Iraq because it is obsessed with Saddam Hussein.  
Adlai Stevenson proved the Europeans wrong then.  It will be 
a major goal of Secretary of State Colin Powell tomorrow.
60
 
 
Commentator Fred Barnes noted that even the French government, which 
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is often held up as the epitome of opposition to aggressive U.S. foreign policy, 
acknowledged the existence of WMDs: ―You know, the French know and 
have acknowledged to the Bush Administration that indeed Saddam does have 
weapons of mass destruction, but they just think, well, we don‘t want to do 
anything about it now.‖61  This statement contains two important implications: 
WMDs must exist if the French acknowledge them, and the French are foolish 
for not wanting to take action. 
News anchors, who at first seemed objective in their questioning, were 
often won over by panelists who confidently proclaimed belief in WMDs.  
For example, when former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was 
interviewed on Hannity & Colmes,
62
 Alan Colmes asserted that weapons 
inspections and neighboring countries were capable of containing Saddam 
Hussein.  Weinberger disagreed: 
 
Well he isn‘t being contained, because all of the promises 
he made at the end of the Gulf War he‘s broken one after the 
other, including throwing the United Nations inspectors out 
now four or five years without any inspection whatever. . . . 
The longer we wait, the more we engage in worthless 
inspections, in accepting more worthless promises, the more 
danger there is, because he‘s moving toward—as Colin 
said—moving toward the acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction, and many of them he has.
63
 
 
Weinberger was reinforcing Colin Powell‘s assertions to the U.N. Security 
Council. 
In response, Colmes (the liberal voice in the Hannity–Colmes team) tried 
to make the point that the Bush Administration did not know that the trucks 
depicted in aerial photographs of Iraq shown by Powell during his speech 
actually contained either the alleged WMDs or the parts used to manufacture 
them.  Colmes said, ―We saw pictures of trucks.  We don‘t know what‘s in 
those trucks, necessarily. . . .  And some of the pictures looked very pretty, but 
we don‘t know what‘s going on in those bunkers, we don‘t know what‘s going 
on in those trucks.‖64 Weinberger responded, 
 
That‘s exactly the point.  We don‘t know what‘s going on 
in them.  Now Colin showed that these are trucks  
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. . . are mobile laboratories.  You can‘t open up each one. 
There are 40,000 or 50,000 trucks that look just like this 
on the roads of Iraq every day, and that means you have to 
take somebody‘s word they are not containing this and that 
they have disarmed.  And you can‘t take the word of a liar.  
You can‘t have a diplomatic solution with a liar.  It‘s just 
really as simple as that.
65
 
 
At this point, Colmes conceded, ―Mr.  Secretary, I don‘t dispute that he‘s 
evil, he‘s a bad guy, he‘s a dictator, he needs to be watched, he needs to be 
contained.  He should have his weapons of mass destruction removed.‖66  
With that, Colmes accepted the contentions of Powell, Weinberger, and the 
Bush Administration that Saddam Hussein was manufacturing WMDs. 
Well after the fact, the U.S. Senate released a report detailing intelligence 
errors that were reflected in Powell‘s speech.  This was after ―State 
Department analysts found dozens of factual problems in drafts of his 
speech,‖67 leading to the removal of twenty-eight of the thirty-eight identified 
errors and distortions.  Even Powell himself admitted, ―It turned out that the 
sourcing was inaccurate and wrong, and in some cases deliberately 
misleading, and for that I am disappointed and I regret it.‖68  Powell referred 
to his speech as a ―blot‖ on his record.69  Based on the numerous documented 
factual errors in Powell‘s presentation and in various drafts of his speech, the 
Senate report concluded that Bush Administration officials were overly eager 
to provide justification to go to war with Iraq.
70
 
D.  Summary of CNN and Fox News Coverage 
Coverage of the period surrounding Colin Powell‘s speech to the United 
Nations Security Council largely supported the Bush Administration‘s take on 
the issues of the al-Qaeda connection and Iraqi WMDs.  Source and panelist 
selection was heavily dominated by official sources and mainstream 
journalists.  In fact, Colin Powell himself was interviewed by Tony Snow, 
who later went to work as press secretary in the Bush White House.
71
  Video 
clips of President Bush and Colin Powell were often used to lead stories and 
panel discussions, and were frequently integrated into the middle of such 
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programming.  Most of the coverage consisted of roundtable discussions with 
various officials, journalists, and experts.  Hard news reporting was relatively 
rare.  In essence, this led to relatively monolithic coverage that supported the 
ultimate decision to go to war in Iraq. 
The opposing viewpoints that did appear were most often the opinions of 
Iraqi officials and journalists.  When domestic skeptics did appear, their 
opinions were isolated and marginalized.  Domestic skeptics were virtually 
non-existent on Fox News.  The oppositional viewpoints expressed on CNN, 
such as those of Democratic Congressman Dennis Kucinich, were buried 
amongst a multitude of opinions in support of Powell.  David Albright, a 
former United Nations weapons inspector who evaluated Powell‘s evidence 
with a critical eye, questioned Powell‘s conclusion that the Iraqis were buying 
aluminum tubes to be used as centrifuges for the production of nuclear bombs: 
―[T]he administration has made the case, particularly in the fall, that . . . the 
only use for these tubes [was] for gas centrifuge.  I think that‘s been 
challenged by many gas centrifuge experts.‖72  Opinions such as Albright‘s 
were available, but the television media rarely used them. 
CNN presented results of a poll taken right after Powell‘s speech that 
indicated that the American people may have actually been more skeptical of 
the Bush Administration than the journalists were.  ―Forty-nine percent of us, 
almost half of all Americans believe that the President would knowingly 
present evidence that he knew was not accurate in order to build his case and 
fifty-eight percent of us believe that the Bush Administration would conceal 
evidence that goes [against] their position.‖73 
IV.  NORMATIVE IDEALS AND JOURNALISTIC PRACTICE 
A.  Constraints on Journalistic Practice 
Questions must be asked about why the media failed to play a more active 
role as the fourth estate in preventing the headlong rush into Iraq.  One such 
question is why was the media not more aggressive in evaluating assertions 
made by the Bush Administration regarding the presence of al-Qaeda and 
WMDs in Iraq.  Opinion polls showed that the public believed these 
assertions—a misperception that persisted among a significant portion of the 
public—long after it became clear that these claims were inaccurate.  So, why 
didn‘t the media take a more critical role in evaluating these claims?  And, 
what happened to the normative goals of providing information from diverse 
viewpoints and of ferreting out the truth? 
The answers to these questions may be linked to several significant 
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constraints on media practice.  First, the media operate with limited resources.  
In recent years, these constraints have radically reshaped the practice of 
journalism.  News organizations like CNN and Fox News are doing less 
original reporting, opting instead for the ―talk show politics‖ model, which is 
far cheaper to produce.  It is relatively inexpensive to put a host in the studio 
with several guests and to engage them in the discussion of issues.  
Developing questions and booking guests requires far less energy and 
resources than the careful research and legwork that goes into producing 
investigative news packages.  In this case, rather than doing thorough 
investigations of the contentions about Iraq‘s ties to al-Qaeda and WMDs, it 
was much more efficient to pull out the journalistic rolodex and invite guests 
to the studio. 
Additionally, it is important to consider what types of guests are invited 
and used as credible sources of information.  Patterns in guest invitations and 
source use follow the lines of power, giving disproportionate voice to high 
government officials.  Of crucial significance are not just the sources that 
supply information, but also the sources who explain the news as pundits,
74
 a 
fact clearly evident in the CNN and Fox News coverage.  Not only are these 
sources powerful in shaping the meanings of issues and events, but the 
audience also may see them as being more objective than original sources, 
though these sources are rarely neutral.  As is typical with many such stories, 
CNN and Fox News coverage was heavily saturated with sources and 
panelists who represented the Bush Administration, or who were hesitant to 
criticize the Bush Administration in light of the rally effects
75
 of the post-
September 11th context. 
The journalistic practice of objectivity also creates conditions for coverage 
that support the interests of the presidential administration.  Journalists are 
socialized with the ideology of objectivity,
76
 which values the ideal of 
neutrality.  However, in practice, whatever an administration official says is 
considered by definition legitimate news, and accorded a high degree of 
credibility.  Critics, particularly those who come from outside the power 
structure, are treated more skeptically.  Journalists avoid giving too much 
attention to radical criticism for fear of being perceived as less-than-objective 
partisans.  In the case of CNN and Fox News coverage, journalists were quick 
to applaud Colin Powell on his performance at the United Nations, but 
hesitant to give significant airtime to those who challenged his assertions. 
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B.  What Happened to Normative Ideals? 
In light of the forces that constrain press performance, we can assess 
journalistic practice with respect to the normative ideals in such conflict 
situations.  As a point of departure, this Article adopts two of the most 
important normative ideals that media in democratic systems should strive to 
uphold: (1) the provision of a forum for diverse perspectives on important 
issues, including both domestic and international conflicts, and (2) the 
performance of the role of independent arbitrators to explain and evaluate 
various positions, including the contentions made by various parties to such 
conflicts, to determine, where possible, what constitutes factual truth. 
The analysis of media performance in the period leading up to the Iraq 
War illustrates the notion that these ideals are simultaneously complementary 
and contradictory.  On one hand, both ideals involve providing information to 
the public to enhance learning, deliberation, and public opinion formation.  
However, in practice, these ideals often contradict each other.  For example, 
should journalists continue to provide balanced perspectives on contested 
public issues when the truth is obvious?  How should journalists respond in a 
social conflict when the facts clearly favor one party to a conflict? 
This analysis of CNN and Fox News coverage reveals that the way these 
news organizations applied these normative ideals was largely dysfunctional 
and ultimately incendiary to the Iraq conflict.  Throughout the post-September 
11th period, the American media was quick to accept Bush Administration 
assertions as truth.  Their heavy reliance on Administration sources treated the 
al-Qaeda connection and Iraqi WMDs as virtually established facts.  As the 
U.S. intervention in Iraq yielded information that contradicted these 
assertions, the media was hesitant to abandon their concern for providing 
balanced viewpoints, treating the Bush Administration assertions as viable 
even in the absence of supporting evidence. 
Ultimately, these normative standards were applied in the reverse of what 
we might consider a logical order.  In a conflict situation, it would be 
desirable for the media to provide competing perspectives until such a time 
when the preponderance of the evidence indicates that one position actually 
represents the truth.  In the case of Iraq, journalistic practice reversed this 
process in the sense that the Bush Administration ―truth‖ was accepted early 
on, and alternative viewpoints were added to the mix only after the emergence 
of countervailing evidence. 
C.  Media Support for Bush Administration Assertions 
What accounts for this reversal in what would seem to be a logical order? 
Literature on the role of mass media in international conflict situations 
provides some answers to this question.  In the early stages, coverage 
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conformed to what Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky call the ―Propaganda 
Model,‖ in which support for official Administration policy is strong.77  The 
parameters of the truth were narrowed in a manner that paved the way for 
relatively uncontested engagement in Iraq.  A variety of factors have been 
identified as contributing to support for a presidential administration during 
international conflicts.  Considerable research has shown that during 
international conflicts, the media—as well as members of the public—tend to 
rally around the presidential administration and its policies.
78
  This reflects the 
general tendency of external conflicts to strengthen internal cohesion and to 
reduce dissent.  Beyond these general social principles, there are also factors 
specific to newsgathering and dissemination routines of contemporary 
mainstream media, often referred to as ―transmission belt‖ journalism.  
Simply put, relaying information from official sources without investing the 
necessary time and resources to investigate its veracity or to seek alternative 
perspectives and relevant facts is an economically efficient journalistic 
practice.  In this case, the upshot was the extended resilience of Bush 
Administration contentions. 
As the Iraqi conflict unfolded and these contentions did not hold up, 
media performance reverted to the practice of ―he said/she said‖ journalism, 
in which both sides—for and against engagement in Iraq—were treated with 
equal regard and relatively little effort was dedicated to the search for the 
truth.  As such, the conflict with Iraq was allowed to fester unbound by 
evidence.  This practice has been encouraged by the resource crisis that 
confronts news organizations.  For example, it is considerably cheaper for the 
television news networks to adopt the talk show and infotainment formats 
than to engage in more traditional investigative reporting.  This practice is 
also supported by the journalistic ideology of objectivity, in which news 
media ritualistically present two sides of issues to maintain the illusion of 
neutrality and balance to avoid appearing partisan by presenting one side as 
being factually correct.  In situations in which the facts tilt toward one side in 
a conflict, the rationale of objectivity becomes a crutch that disables the 
search for the truth.  In this case, the official policy line was maintained long 
after it was no longer factually viable. 
V.  CONSEQUENCES FOR SOCIAL CONFLICT 
In reviewing these journalistic practices and the content of their coverage, 
it is important to consider their consequences in terms of both the public and 
the dynamics of this conflict.  The scope of the negative consequences of the 
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U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq is difficult to fully comprehend.  For 
example, tracing the extent to which the massive expenditure of U.S. 
resources in Iraq has contributed to the current global economic peril is 
obviously complicated.  In addition, it is hard to say whether the massive 
military deployment in Iraq has hampered efforts to capture the parties 
responsible for the September 11th terrorist attacks, who may still be 
operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Yet other consequences are fairly 
clear.  To date, there have been 4,352 U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq and 31,529 
wounded, with an additional 318 fatalities among soldiers from other 
contributing nations;
79
 moreover, there have been more than 50,000 fatalities 
among Iraqi security forces and civilians.
80
  It is also clear that U.S. 
involvement in Iraq has been an international relations disaster for U.S. 
foreign policy. 
In terms of public knowledge, it is evident that large segments of the U.S. 
population accepted the assertions of the Bush Administration.  Data from the 
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of 
Maryland show that the belief in the al-Qaeda connection to the pre-war Iraqi 
government was at 52% in 2004 and 49% in 2006.
81
  Similarly, in October 
2004, 49% of the American public believed that the pre-war Iraqi government 
possessed WMDs,
82
 despite the fact that no such weapons were discovered, 
much less used during the war.  In March 2006, this belief was still at 41%.
83
 
Collectively, such beliefs appear to be a major contributor to support for 
U.S. engagement in the Iraq conflict.  In 2006, support for the war was at 62% 
among people who believed that Iraq played a direct role in the September 
11th attacks, while it was only at 15% among those who felt there was no 
such connection.
84
  Similarly, the perception that going to war in Iraq was the 
correct decision was at 85% for people who believed that Iraq possessed 
actual WMDs, but only 5% among people who did not share that belief.
85
 
These observations, and the fact that support for the Iraq War declined 
markedly over time as Americans became aware that the al-Qaeda 
connections and WMDs did not exist, point to the fact that U.S. engagement 
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in the conflict was predicated on false beliefs.  The mainstream media‘s 
failure to play an adjudicating role in separating fact from fiction inherently 
makes them complicit in the conflict and its disastrous consequences. 
Questions might be raised as to whether the case of the build-up to the 
Iraq War was an idiosyncratic event, or whether it reflects a common pattern 
in the dynamics of such international conflicts.  Historical evidence suggests 
the latter.  For example, the limited scope of viewpoint diversity can be 
observed in the case of the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, in which the American public was presented with the rather 
uniform view that U.S. actions were justified.  Media coverage exhibited a 
similar pattern of monolithic support for the Vietnam War, at least until 
leaders within the power structure and large segments of the American public 
turned against the war.
86
  Similarly, mainstream media coverage of the 1983 
Soviet downing of KAL007 followed the official U.S. policy version of 
events; for example, the Reagan Administration‘s claim that the Soviets 
intentionally shot down a passenger airliner persisted as the dominant view 
long after cockpit transcripts revealed that the Soviet fighter pilots had no idea 
about the nature of the target.
87
  These and other examples point to the fact 
that this is a common pattern. 
VI.  REESTABLISHING JOURNALISTIC PRACTICE IN  
SOCIAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS 
In light of this discussion, this Article concludes by examining a model 
that might be used to frame the normative role that media should play in such 
conflicts.  If we were to consider conflicts that center around issue 
controversies over factual disputes (from local to international conflicts) as 
courtroom trials, with the public sitting as jury, the role of mass media should 
be to serve as the judge.  The media should start by identifying the relevant 
parties involved—not only the major players, but also the various publics 
affected by conflict outcomes.  They should then present competing 
viewpoints and perspectives as accurately and as thoroughly as possible.  
When claims are made, the media should assemble and evaluate evidence that 
is germane to the dispute.  Finally, they should render decisions only when 
warranted in light of preponderance of evidence, regardless of the status of the 
parties involved with respect to the existing power structure. 
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